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INTRODUCTION
The arbitration of securities disputes is not new. The New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) instituted a program to arbitrate
member/nonmember' disputes in 1872.2 Although arbitration
agreements have a long history, they have gained new significance
in recent years.
According to one commentator, "[s]ubstantially all customer
margin account and option account agreements include provisions
compelling future disputes relating to the account to be submitted
to arbitration. ' 3 The creation and implementation of these agree-
ments is becoming more common. The number of arbitration cases
increased nine hundred percent between 1980 and 1987, 4 and ap-
proximately eighteen new disputes per day were submitted in 1988.1
The importance of securities dispute arbitration is growing along
with its frequency. At a time when broker-customer disputes are
I This arbitration program settled disputes between traders who were members of
the NYSE and their customers.
2 Lipton, Broker-Dealer Regulation, 15 SEc. L. SeRms § 4.01[1], at 4-2 (1988).
3 Bloomenthal, Securities and Federal Corporate Law, 3A SEc. L. SERms at §
8.30[2][e], 8-154.13 (1989).
4 Massachusetts Proposal Barring Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Debated, 20 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1219 (July 29, 1988) [hereinafter Massachusetts Proposal].
I Id. (quoting Deborah Masucci, NASD Director of Arbitration); see also Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Securities Industry Association at Appendix A, Rodriguez de Quijas
v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., _U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (No. 88-385)
[hereinafter SIA Brief to Quijas] (statistics for SRO-conducted arbitrations in 1987);
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Securities Industry Association at Appendix B, Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44) [hereinafter SIA
Brief to McMahon] (statistics for arbitrations conducted by SROs between July 1, 1979
and June 30, 1985); Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FoRDaH
L. REv. 279, 280 n.7 (1984) (statistics on SRO arbitrations in 1984); Duke, SEC Rules on
Investor-Broker Disputes, Wall St. J., May 11, 1989, at Cl, col. 5 (Arbitration cases have
"skyrocketed" in the 1980s); Wall St. J., December 22, 1988, at A1,'col. 5 (eight percent
increase in arbitrations for November 1988 as compared to November 1987); Salwen,
Investors Swamp Securities Arbitration System, Wall St. J., March 15, 1988, at 37, col. I
(growing rate of disputes submitted to arbitration spurred by Black Monday of 1987).
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becoming more frequent, 6 brokerage contract provisions specifying
arbitral dispute resolution have met with increasing judicial ap-
proval.7 As a result, public investors may now find themselves
airing their grievances in arbitration-a process that they are likely
to believe is unfairly biased.
In May 1989, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.8 overruled a thirty-six-year old
precedent, and held that predispute arbitration agreements are
enforceable for claims brought by customers under the express
right of action granted in the Securities Act of 1933.9 The decision
harmonized inconsistent precedents regarding the enforceability of
agreements for claims brought under the Securities Act of 193310
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.11
Enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements raises con-
cerns about investor protection, a recognized policy underlying the
Securities Act. The need for such protection caused the Supreme
Court in Wilko v. Swann12 to create a special exception to the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).13 This exception allowed investors
to unilaterally invalidate arbitration agreements and to have their
disputes heard in federal court.14 Investor protection was a suffi-
ciently important policy goal to prompt a specific exception to the
general federal policy'5 endorsing arbitration as a dispute resolu-
tion method. The Supreme Court, however, in Rodriguez de Qui-
jas, comes full circle by endorsing arbitration as a protector of
investor rights, thus precluding judicial remedies.' 6
6 See Ingersoll, Sleepy Watchdogs, Wall St. J., July 21, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (121%
increase in complaints to the SEC from customers concerning brokers in 1986 as compared
to 1982; 171% increase in same period for complaints to the NASD); Scheibla, Big
Decision-Can You Sue a Broker? High Court to Say, Barron's, March 2, 1987, at 32
(high rates of protests against brokers).
7 See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., -U.S. -
109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (holding arbitration agreements enforceable for Securities Act
claims); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding
Arbitration Act establishes duty to enforce arbitration agreements); Vincent R. Iacono
M.D., Inc. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 18 (D. R.I. 1989) (citing
strong policy favoring enforcement of arbitration clauses).
- U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
Id. at 1921.
15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982) [hereinafter Securities Act].
"15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
12 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
1 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
14 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953).
,1 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982); see also Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987).
'1 See Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
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This Comment assesses the impact of Rodriguez de Quijas and
other contemporary changes on investor protection. Part I dis-
cusses the holding, rationale, and precedential importance of Rod-
riguez de Quijas.'7 Part II examines the conflict between the FAA's
promotion of judicial economy and expediency, and the investor
protection purposes of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.' 8
Part III addresses unique aspects of securities arbitration, includ-
ing recent improvements and changes, in determining whether this
system adequately protects investors. 19 Finally, this Comment con-
cludes that, while arbitration of securities disputes is fair and
workable, it suffers from a poor public image. Arbitration's image
must improve in order to perform the significant function of
bolstering public confidence in the securities market by providing
a swift and equitable procedure to resolve disputes.
I. THm RODIGUEZ DE QUIAS DECISION
A. Historical Background
1. Creation of the Wilko Exception
In 1953, the Supreme Court's decision in Wilko v. Swann20
created an exception to the FAA. Wilko involved a dispute be-
tween a customer and broker concerning fraudulent misrepresen-
tations made in violation of the Securities Act.21 The Court held
that the express right of action granted in the Securities Act should
be protected by recourse to a judicial forum regardless of arbitra-
tion clauses contained in brokerage contracts. 22 The exception, like
others in the law,23 was based primarily on deficiencies in arbitra-
tion procedures. 24 Although the Wilko Court addressed only claims
" See infra notes 20-66 and accompanying text.
"1 See infra notes 67-112 and accompanying text.
,9 See infra notes 113-211 and accompanying text.
- 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
21 Id. at 429.
n Id. at 437.
Other FAA exceptions exist where issues of larger public interest are involved,
including antitrust and patent actions. See Note, Arbitration of Securities Claims, 1987
CoLurm. Bus. L. REv. 527, 537 n.71 (1987).
14 These deficiencies included the lack of judicial review of the arbitrator's legal
interpretations, the absence of written records or explanations of awards, and the imposed
surrender of an investor's choice of venue. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953).
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brought under the Securities Act, other courts later used the
investor protection rationale to enforce arbitration agreements
brought under the implied rights of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 10b-5. 25
2. The Waning of the Wilko Exception
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has weakened
the Wilko exception. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., a lOb-5
case arising from an international contract, the Court enforced an
arbitration agreement.26 The need for predictability in foreign
transactions and protection of the parties' expectations persuaded
the court to validate the agreement in this context.
27
By the mid-1980s, support within the Supreme Court for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements increased. In Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, the Court rejected the intertwining doc-
trine, which extended pendent jurisdiction to arbitrable state law
claims if sufficiently intertwined with non-arbitrable federal
claims. 2 No longer could parties block arbitration of state law
claims by this method of forum selection. 29 As one commentator
stated, the denial of a federal judicial forum showed the Supreme
Court's "strong predilection toward enforcing predispute agree-
ments to submit disputes to arbitration. ' 30 More significant, in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the Court
rejected a "presumption against arbitration of statutory claims"
absent contrary congressional intent.31 One author described Mit-
subishi as recognizing the competence of arbitral tribunals "to
determine complex disputes involving important issues of public
See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir.
1979) (arbitration agreements overriden by anti-waiver provision of federal securities laws);
Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977) (claims under federal securities laws generally not subject to arbitration under
preexisting arbitration clause); Ayers v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538
F.2d 532, 536 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976) (anti-waiver provision of
Exchange Act prevents agreements to arbitrate further securities controversies); Greater
Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir. 1970) (questions concerning
fraud under Rule lOb-5 are properly litigated in court).
- 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974).
Id. at 516-17.
- 470 U.S. 213, 216 (1985).
21 Id. at 217.
10 Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][a], 8-154.1.
31 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
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policy."' 32 These decisions reflect the growing confidence of the
Court in the ability of arbitration to provide justice.
During this period, pressure mounted on lower courts to en-
force arbitration clauses in brokerage contracts. In the last seven
months of 1987, there were forty cases in which brokers attempted
to enforce arbitration agreements. 33 Although still the law, Wilko
was losing vitality in some circumstances, particularly where the
parties possessed equal bargaining power. One commentator stated
that "courts generally [did] not apply the Wilko restraint ...
when it [was] clear that the parties [were] knowledgeable persons-
for example, a sophisticated investor and a broker-dealer-and
that the arbitration agreement was the result of an arm's length
transaction."
3 4
The shifting policies of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) during this period also heralded Wilko's waning power.
SEC Rule 15c2-2, 35 which took effect on January 1, 1984, made
it illegal for brokers to create agreements purporting to bind
customers to arbitration. The rule also required disclosure of
unenforceability to customers who entered into agreements prior
to adoption of the rule.36 The SEC designed Rule 15c2-2 to protect
investor rights, yet, within four years of its enactment, the rule
was repealed as no longer appropriate in light of case law devel-
opment.3 7 By 1987, the SEC reversed its position on predispute
agreements, and argued for their enforcement.38 Due to expansions
in its oversight authority, the Commission advocated dispute ar-
bitration through self-regulatory organizations (SROs).
39
,1 Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][a], 8-154.2. But cf. Comment, Investor
Protection After McMahon: The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 544
n.48 (1988) (citing pre-McMahon cases that question arbitrator ability to decide policy
issues).
11 See Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at 8-154.1.
1' Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAI L. REv.
279, 295 (1984).
35 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (repealed by Securities Exchange Release No. 25034 [1987
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987)).
36 Id.
31 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 25034 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,163 (Oct. 15, 1987).
33 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of the SEC, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44) [hereinafter SEC Brief to McMahon).
11 See infra notes 140-53 and accompanying text.
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3. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon: The
Creation of Inconsistency
The Supreme Court laid the theoretical foundation for Rod-
riguez de Quijas several years earlier. In 1987, the Court decided
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,4° a controversial
decision that departed from the Wilko exception. Affirming its
resolve that arbitration was an effective protector of investor
rights, the Court held that claims brought under the 1934 Securities
and Exchange Act did not require judicial resolution. 41 The Court
based its conclusion on improvements in arbitration, 42 expanded
SEC oversight of SRO arbitration procedures, 43 and the lack of a
clear congressional intent to restrict securities claims to a judicial
forum." This ruling, however, was limited to claims brought under
the Exchange Act. 45 Thus, McMahon created an inconsistency; the
Court would enforce arbitration agreements under the Exchange
Act but not under the Securities Act.
4. Rodriguez de Quijas and the Death of the Wilko Exception
On May 15, 1989, the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express." On facts "identical to
Wilko," 47 the Court held that the "special" right of action granted
by the Securities Act 48 did not need the protection of a judicial
forum, and that arbitration agreements are enforceable for claims
brought under either act.
49
In addition, the Court expressly stated that Wilko was incor-
rectly decided. 0 The Court overruled Wilko, finding it to be
"inconsistent with the prevailing uniform construction of other
- 482 U.S. 220 (1987). This case involved alleged fraudulent conduct by a retail
broker who invested a private pension fund, as well as personal funds, for a funeral home
director.
4 Id. at 238.
42 Id. at 232.
41 Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234-35.
11 Id. at 233-36.
- - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
' Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][c], 8-154.8.
41 See infra note 86.
4 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., U.S. , 109 S.
Ct. 1917, 1922 (1989).
'o Id.; see also infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
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federal statutes governing arbitration agreements in the setting of
business transactions."
'51
B. The Probable Longevity of Rodriguez de Quijas-The Supreme
Court and Precedents of Statutory Interpretation
According to one scholar, the current Court faces a "conser-
vative paradox."' 52 The conservative philosophy of cautious move-
ment works against activism and makes it less likely that the Court
will reverse important decisions of the past.53 The force of the
conservative paradox indicates that once a judicial move is made,
the Court will tend to adhere to its interpretation.
5 4
The Supreme Court will overturn its own precedents only if
they do not "state the correct rule of law." ' 55 While the Court has
the exclusive power to overrule its own decisions 5 6 the need for
correction must be balanced against the goal of consistent and
predictable application of the law.
57
Contemporary cases illustrate what the Court requires to over-
turn a statutory interpretation precedent. In Patterson v. McLean
Credit Unions58 the Court outlined the greater "burden 6orne by
the party advocating the abandonment of an established precedent
... of statutory construction," that unlike constitutional inter-
pretation, may be altered by Congress.5 9 In deciding whether to
overrule precedents of statutory interpretation, the Court applies
a three-part test that examines whether the decision has been
undermined by subsequent changes or legal developments, whether
the rule of law is unworkable, and whether the decision poses an
obstacle to objectives embodied in other statutes. 0
Although at least one commentator has questioned the vola-
tility of Constitutional interpretations in recent decades, 61 statutory
"1 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
52 Fletcher, Learning to Live With the Federal Arbitration Act-Securities Litigation
in a Post McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 114 n.97 (1988).
53 Id.
"Id.
See Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1945).
6 See Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535
(1983); see also Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1923 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Court
not subject to restraints placed on courts of appeals in upsetting own precedents).
17 See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1979).
- U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
Id. at 2370.
6Id. at 2370-71.
6" Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980
Wis. L. Rav. 467 (1980).
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interpretation precedents such as Rodriguez de Quijas are less
likely to change. In Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court spoke of its
"normal and proper" reluctance to overturn decisions construing
statutes.62 Apparently, the Court believed that the respondents in
Rodriguez de Quijas carried the greater burden required to aban-
don an established statutory interpretation n3 Developments in ar-
bitration undermined the rationale of the Wilko exception. 64 The
differing treatment of claims under the 1933 and 1934 Acts after
McMahon proved unworkable, leading to concerns regarding "ma-
nipulation of allegations" to secure a desired forum. 65 Finally, the
divergent treatment of claims under the two acts "undermine[d]
congressional policy as expressed in other legislation."
66
The Court in Rodriguez de Qui/as moved in apparent harmony
with its current holdings to overturn Wilko and achieve a uniform
interpretation of two similar statutes. Absent affirmative Con-
gressional action to the contrary, one may reasonably expect that
predispute arbitration agreements will be enforceable for some
years to come.
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION VS. THE JUDICIAL ECONOMY OF
ARBITRATION
A. Arbitration
1. Enactment of the FAA: Policy Goals
The development of arbitration as a means of alternative dis-
pute resolution has been hindered by "centuries of judicial hostil-
ity to arbitration agreements." 67 In 1925, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)61 "with the express intent of erasing
the traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration, and of com-
pelling judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. ' 69
62 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
63 Id. at 1921.
64 Id. at 1920.
65 Id. at 1922.
66Id.
67 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). See generally Special
Project, Self-Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges, and Remedies in Contemporary Amer-
ican Society, 37 VAND. L. REv. 845, 922 (1984) (history and application of arbitration).
- 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
69 Comment, The Case for Domestic Arbitration of Federal Securities Claims: Is the
Wilko Doctrine Still Valid?, 16 Sw. U.L. R-v. 619, 621 (1986).
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In statutory language that is a "model of clarity and simplic-
ity,"7 the FAA advances the federal goal of promoting arbitra-
tion. The FAA is designed to allow judicial enforcement of all
arbitration agreements. Under the Act, agreements are enforceable
as contracts, and may be specifically enforced in the absence of
controversy surrounding the creation of or compliance with the
agreement. 71 Moreover, any doubts regarding the arbitrability of
issues must be resolved in favor of arbitration.
72
The policy goals supporting the FAA are as clear and simple
as the language of the act itself. After years of hostility, courts
now recognize the potential benefits of arbitration, both to the
parties and to the courts .73 The FAA raises arbitration agreements
to the level of enforceable contracts, thereby promoting arbitration
and its benefits. According to several authors, "the Arbitration
Act simply codifies the common law duty of courts to enforce the
terms of valid contracts, and was necessitated only by the tradi-
tional reluctance of courts to enforce arbitration clauses." ' 74
Thus, the FAA promotes a policy that was perceived to be at
odds with that of securities regulations: the promotion of effi-
ciency, speed, and economy rather than the protection of inves-
tors' statutory rights.
B. Securities Regulation: Designed to Protect Investors
1. Policies Supporting the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
In most broker-customer disputes, public investors seek to
enforce rights granted under either the Securities Act or the Ex-
change Act.75 To analyze properly the effects of Rodriguez de
70 Bedell, Harrison, & Grant, Arbitrability: Current Developments in the Interpre-
tation and Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 3 (1987).
-' 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
7 See Moses H.'Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983).
71 See, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988)
(questions regarding arbitrability must be resolved in light of policy favoring arbitration);
Brener v. Becker Paribus Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (arbitration designed to
avoid expense and delay of litigation).
74 Bedell, Harrison & Grant, supra note 70.
71 Both acts provide protection to the investing public through prohibition of fraud-
ulent acts by brokers. See infra notes 76-106 and accompanying text; see also N. WOLFSON,
R. Pma Lus, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS, AND SEcuRmis MARrTS
2.01 (1977).
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Quijas, one must examine the purposes of these two regulatory
acts in order to determine whether their implicit goals require
disparate treatment of arbitration agreements for actions to en-
force the rights granted by their provisions.
The purposes and provisions of the 1933 Securities Act are
unquestionably different from those of the 1934 Exchange Act.
76
Congress designed the Securities Act to protect the investing public"
by regulating dealers, 78 underwriters, 79 and issuers of securities.
8 0
On the other hand, the Exchange Act's "primary focus [is] ...
on the creation and maintenance of an efficient and orderly capital
market.' ' s8 Its provisions deal principally with securities trading
after public distribution.8 2 Although their areas of regulation are
different, the two Acts have at least one common goal-the pro-
tection of investors. 83
Investor protection is such an important purpose of the Se-
curities Act that its provisions create an express right of action
for public investors.8 4 As part of its protective mechanism, the
Act requires that the defendant show lack of scienter.85 Further-
more, the Act provides for lowered amount in controversy
requirements8 6 and concurrent jurisdiction without removal to the
federal courts.87 On the other hand, the investor rights of action
76 See generally Introductory Comment, A Historical Introduction to the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 329, 342-52 (1988)
(purposes of two acts).
7 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1934).
78 A dealer is one who engages in the business of buying and selling securities for
his own account. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12).
79 An underwriter is one who buys securities from an issuer and/or participates in
the distribution of those securities to the public. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I1).
so An issuer is one who issues securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4).
81 See Comment, supra note 69, at 625.
12 Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FoRDF.AM URB. L.J. 361, 366
(1988).
83 See 78 CONo. Rnc. 2264 (1934) (message from President Roosevelt) (The Securities
Act was "but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors"; the
Exchange Act was enacted "for the protection of investors").
" Any person who violates the provisions of the act "shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
83 Id.
86 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). Although it illustrates the traditional concern for investor
protection, this provision is of little importance today. Since 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 no
longer contains an amount in controversy requirement.
g7 Id.
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provided under the Exchange Act are judicially implied. 88
Although the statutes have similar goals, the different sources
of public rights of action raise controversy about the need for
differing treatment of arbitration agreements.8 9 The desire to pro-
tect investors resulted in nonenforcement of arbitration agreements
for claims brought under the Securities Act's express right of
action.9 On the other hand, McMahon required the opposite result
for arbitration claims brought under the Exchange Act's implied
right of action. 91
This inconsistent treatment proved problematic. Substantial
judicial authority indicates that, despite differences in their pro-
visions, the two acts are interrelated components of the same
federal regulatory scheme. 92 The Court in Rodriguez de Quijas
questioned the manipulation of claims by customers if the Acts
were not construed alike. 93 As one court stated in a post-Rodriguez
de Quijas decision, "[d]ivergent treatment of ... controversies
would lead to arbitrary and inefficient results.
' 94
The Court resolved the inconsistency caused by McMahon by
holding that the enforceability of arbitration agreements no longer
u The Courts created judicially implied remedies for customers harmed by violations
of the Act's general anti-fraud provisions, particularly Rule IOb-5. See Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Implied rights of action also are
recognized under Rule 14a-9, and Section 14(e). Such actions have lengthened statutes of
limitations and lessened procedural restrictions. See generally H. BLOOmENTHAL, SEcUrurs
LAW HANDBOOK § 12.01 (1988).
, See, e.g., Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030-31 (6th Cir.
1979) (holding separate statute claims arbitrable); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977) (holding that non-intertwined claims can
be submitted to arbitration); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 538
F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976) (holding that NYSE rule
requiring arbitration for grievances did not eliminate the right of an employee injured by
a lob-5 violation to have recourse to a judicial forum); Greater Continental Corp. v.
Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding that arbitration clause only applied to
employment dispute and not to whether purchase contract was valid); see also Note,
Arbitrability of Implied Rights of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 506 (1986) (arguing pre-McMahon that differences in acts justify
non-arbitrability of claims under Exchange Act).
10 See Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
,1 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
92 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 727-30 (1975); cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 1978) (similarities of acts formed basis
for application of Wilko doctrine to claims brought under both acts).
93 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., -U.S. - , 109 S.
Ct. 1917, 1922 (1989).
4 Vincent R. Iacono M.D., Inc. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 715 F. Supp.
18, 23 (D.R.I. 1989).
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depends upon the nature of the rights enforced. 95 This analysis
directly parallels the interpretation provided by the SEC. In its
amicus curiae brief filed in McMahon, the SEC argued that any
distinction between express and implied rights is irrelevant to
enforceability, and that attempts to draw such distinctions could
impair investor protection. 96 According to the Commission, the
crucial factor is the voluntary nature of the agreement.97 Rather
than concentrating on the nature of the rights involved, the SEC
interpretation examines the agreement as a contract. 98 At least one
court followed this reasoning and found any distinction between
express and implied rights of action meaningless. 99
The effectiveness of a contract-based analysis of arbitration
agreements is borne out by the nature of the disputes that typically
arise. Controversy surrounding enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments largely centers on predispute agreements.00 Post-dispute
agreements' 0' have long been held enforceable, 0 2 due in part to
their more voluntary nature. By analyzing post-dispute agreements
as contracts, the courts harmonize interpretations of the 1933 and
1934 acts as a unified regulatory scheme. Contract law principles
such as unconscionability, 03  fraudulent inducement, 0 4 and
mistake05 have been applied to arbitration agreements as a whole,
106
and a focus on the mutual agreement of the parties provides a
more correct analytical framework for examining the enforceabil-
95 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
- SEC Brief to McMahon, supra note 38, at 21-22; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 402-406 (1970) (nature, not source, of remedy
sought is key determinant in availability of relief for civil rights violations).
" SEC Brief to McMahon, supra note 38, at 24.
9 Id.
" Wolfe v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 482 U.S. 923 (1987).
- See 346 U.S. at 438.
101 The parties enter into these agreements after a dispute arises.
1o2 See, e.g., Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1968);
Malena v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 91,492 (April 18, 1984).
"I See generally E. FARuswoRTa, CoNRA&cTs 307-316 (1982).
104 See generally id. at 235-36.
101 See generally id. at 670.
-o See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1966)
(holding that court may consider fraudulent inducement in the making and performance
of arbitration agreement); Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1984) (allowing complaint
alleging fraudulent inducement); Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 669 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
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ity of arbitration agreements for claims brought under either of
the two acts.
The 1933 and 1934 acts do not require different treatment of
claims. A unified interpretation for enforcement of arbitration
agreements produces results that are more logical and consistent.
The goal of investor protection is thus fulfilled by analysis of the
disputes as issues of contract law.
2. Analogous Investor Protection
The need for investor protection resulted in a long history of
special treatment of securities disputes. Courts have treated arbi-
tration agreements between brokers and customers differently from
similar agreements that are unrelated to the securities industry. 07
The goal of investor protection led not only to decisions limiting
the enforceability of arbitration agreements, but also to the crea-
tion of special protective mechanisms in other, broader areas of
securities regulation.10 8
The parties in public securities transactions usually do not
possess equal bargaining power. In order to protect investors in
uneven exchanges, the definition of securities fraud differs from
the common-law definition. Securities brokers are liable for active
misstatements and are charged with affirmative duties'09 to disclose
material information in their possession. 10
Congress and the judiciary created private rights of action for
the investing public not only to provide a remedial pathway for
the investor, but also to serve a larger public function. Private
suits are "an effective and indispensable supplement to the 'polic-
ing' of the federal securities laws." ' With the individual's power
to bring suit to enforce public laws, the investor becomes a private
attorney general. Private suits are "a necessary supplement to
- See, e.g., Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (arbitration insufficient to protect investor rights);
Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (implied extension of Wilko doctrine to Exchange Act claims);
Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977)
(protection of investors needed due to unequal bargaining power).
- These mechanisms include an expanded definition of fraud, prohibitions against
insider trading, and standards of conduct for dealing with customers. See generally N.
WoLrsoN, R. PHLLUs & T. Russo, supra note 75, at 2-1 - 2-90.
1*9 Courts base the duty to disclose on two foundations: the so-called "shingle"
theory, which posits that brokers who hang out their shingles to the public represent that
they will deal fairly and honestly, and the fiduciary relationship theory. See id. at 2.03.
"0 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972).
Ma H. BLOOMEN rHa, supra note 88, at § 11.01.
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[SEC] enforcement" of securities laws. 12 Thus, the goal of inves-
tor protection is enhanced by allowing public and private deter-
rence.
III. DOES THE CURRENT SCHEME OF ENFORCEMENT OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR
INVESTORS?
A. Investor Protection vs. Public Mistrust of Arbitration
Courts recognize that investor protection is a goal of securities
laws in general, and the Securities Act in particular."13 The need
for protection arises in part from the likelihood of conflicts of
interest. As one court stated, "[t]here is a potential for conflicts
of interest when an investor's marketplace intermediary ... has
one unilateral adversarial eye cocked upon possible litigation be-
tween the parties to a standardized brokerage contract.""14 Con-
flicts are inherent in today's securities market; they are produced
in part by the brokerage industry's compensation structure."
5
Changes in market conditions such as the growth of program
trading" 6 and derivative instruments1 7 have hurt the small inves-
tor."8 Even in the face of such conflicts, the Supreme Court
plainly indicates that the goal of investor protection is reached
2 J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
See, e.g., Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S. 427, 435; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd,
726 F.2d 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); cf. Fletcher, Privatizing
Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L.
REv. 427-31 (1987) (arguing prior to McMahon for "sophisticated investor" exception to
Wilko due to lesser need for protection).
"' Woodyard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 760, 766
(S.D. Tex. 1986); see also Rock, How to Avoid Being Ripped Off By a Lousy Broker,
MONEY, May 1988, at 64.
" See generally 1 S. GOLDBERG, FRAUDULENT BROKER-DEALER PRAcncEs § 2.2[a]
(1978) (system of broker compensation based on commission generated for firm creates
clearest imaginable conflict of interest).
116 Program trading involves the use of automation to order purchases or sales as
certain stocks or market indexes attain pre-specified levels.
'7 Derivative instruments are traded securities, such as option contracts, which derive
their value from the price of the underlying security.
I See Solomon & Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis,
57 FORDHAM L. REv. 191 (1988); see also Edgerton, The Crash of '87: How the Small
Investor Got the Shaft, MONEY, Jan. 1988, at 13 (public perception of bias against small
investor).
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through arbitration, an "avenue of relief ... in harmony with
the Securities Act's concern to protect buyers of securities." ' 1 9
The Court's reasoning in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon'" and its progeny is based largely on increased judicial
acceptance of arbitration as a means of protecting investors: "the
heart of the Majority opinion focuses on the arbitration process
and the substantial improvements made to it since the Wilko
decision in 1953. ' ' 21 The "suspicion of arbitration"' that formed
the basis of Wilko v. Swann123 is far from the contemporary
endorsements of arbitration statutes.'24
Yet public opinion does not support the Court's judgment.125
Mistrust by the investing public is at the center of controversy
surrounding predispute arbitration agreements. 26 The suspicion
still harbored by investors is a significant problem in securities
arbitration. Prejudice against arbitration harms public confidence
in the securities markets. 27 The perception of unfairness, however
unjustified, prevents arbitration from being an accepted method
of securities dispute resolution.'2
Evidence does not indicate that arbitration is unfair. The re-
sults of arbitrations are the best indication of fairness. A biased
and unfair system should produce awards that favor the brokerage
houses, or that are unjustifiably small. If a few recent awards are
illustrative, at least some investors are faring well under arbitra-
29 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., -...._U.S. -, 109 S.
Ct. 1917, at 1922 (1989).
' 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
2 Comment, supra note 32, at 567-68.
122 Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
M 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
4 Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
'21 See, e.g., How Investors Can Avoid the Bind of Binding Arbitration, MONEY,
Sep. 1988, at 27; Meyer, Why Stockbrokers Sleep at Night, MONEY, July 1987, at 105;
Recourse for the Burned Investor, MoNEY, Jan. 1988, at 20; Rock, Making Arbitration
Pay Off for You, MoNEY, May 1988, at 66; Sivy, It's Time to Ban Forced Arbitration,
MONEY, July 1989, at 7; Weiss, Can Disgruntled Investors Turn the Tables On Their
Brokers?, BusiNEss WEEK, Aug. 8, 1988, at 61; Salwen, Investors Swamp Securities
Arbitration System, Wall St. J., March 15, 1988, at 37, col. 1.
216 See Ingersoll, SEC Proposes New Rules for Arbitration, Wall St. J., Sept. 11,
1987, at 29 col. 3; Shell, Keep Broker-Client Disputes Out of Court, Wall St. J., March
3, 1987, at 32, col. 3.
I" See Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitra-
tion Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 460 (1987).
228 See Katsoris, supra note 34, at 310; Note, supra note 23, at 545-49.
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tion.129 According to information provided by the American Ar-
bitration Association (AAA) in 1987, of the last forty disputes
resolved by that organization, twenty-seven (sixty-eight percent)
resulted in awards to customers, including four instances of pu-
nitive damages. 130
The ability to award punitive damages works in favor of the
customer. While some state courts bar punitive damages in arbi-
tration,1 3' federal courts allow such awards if they are specified in
the arbitration agreement.1
32
Protection of investor confidence, perhaps the most vital func-
tion of securities regulation laws, must therefore be addressed
through improvements to the arbitral process. Arbitration must
preserve speed and economy without sacrificing fairness and com-
pleteness. Any changes in arbitration must take these factors into
account, with fairness being the primary element 33 in order to
protect public faith in the process.
B. Investor Protection and Unique Aspects of Securities
Arbitration
1. Procedural Features
SEC concerns about the procedural aspects of SRO arbitration
have been present for at least the last several years. 34 According
to one author who shares similar concerns,
129 For descriptions of recent substantial awards favorable to customers, see Shearson-
Lehman Loses $3.1 Million NASD Case, Today's Investor, July 7, 1989, at 2; Areddy,
Shearson Lehman, Paine Webber Told to Pay Big Awards, Wall St. J., May 25, 1989, at
C9 col. 3; see also NYSE Proposes Highlighting Rights, Providing Summary Data on
Arbitrations, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1783 (Nov. 23, 1988) [hereinafter NYSE
Proposes Highlighting] (NYSE survey indicates arbitration is significantly quicker, less
expensive, and results in customer awards significantly higher than those obtained in
litigation); Massachusetts Proposal, supra note 4 (study of cases involving Dean Witter
Reynolds indicates higher rate of customer recovery for arbitrated disputes).
,1, Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Arbitration Association at 17, Shearson/
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44) [hereinafter AAA
Brief to McMahon].
"' See, e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y.
1976).
32 See Willis v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 821, (M.D.N.C.
1983) (court allowed arbitrator to award punitive damages pursuant to written agreement);
cf. Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala.
1984) (flexibility in enforcement needed to give substance to national policy favoring
arbitration), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985).
"' Katsoris, supra note 34, at 370-71.
SEC Staff to Urge Revisions to Industry Arbitration System, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1387 (Sep. 18, 1987) [hereinafter SEC Staff to Urge].
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the arbitration system provides minimal assurance that an arbi-
trator will act properly and fairly when deciding a securities
issue. By contrast, in litigation the investor has an established
procedure and right to challenge judicial actions and decisions.
This insures that the twin objectives of justice and investor
protection are consistently being accomplished.'35
One SEC official, while characterizing arbitration as the best
method of dispute resolution for most customers, listed litigation
advantages as rational reasons why customers would refuse a
predispute agreement. 13 6 Despite these views, there are compelling
arguments that arbitration's simplified procedures and limited dis-
covery are advantageous to customer-plaintiffs.1
37
Securities dispute arbitrations usually proceed along similar
lines, regardless of the presiding organization.138 SRO procedures
follow the Uniform Code of Arbitration, drafted by the Securities
Industry Council on Arbitration (SICA).' 39. The NYSE and Amer-
ican Exchange (AMEX)' 40 have adopted the Uniform Code of
Arbitration while the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), the largest conductor of SRO arbitrations,' 41 follows
procedures based on the Uniform Code and the FAA. 142
Third parties such as the AAA may also conduct dispute
resolution. 43 This avenue of arbitration, called for by some agree-
ments,' 44 is designed to be "more independent of the securities
UI Comment, supra note 32, at 573.
"16 SEC Tables Proposal to Bar Brokers From Mandating Predispute Agreements, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 832 (June 3, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Tables Proposal] (quoting
SEC Division of Market Regulation Director Richard Ketchum).
137 Customers may find that arbitration's lack of strict pleading requirements for
fraud protects their ability to bring actions. See Fletcher, supra note 127, at 453-54; Hood,
Arbitration and Litigation of Public Customers' Claims Against Broker-Dealers After
McMahon, 19 ST. MARY's L.J. 541, 581-85 (1988); see also Note, Pleading Securities
Fraud Claims With Particularity Under Rule 9(b), 97 HARv. L. Rav. 1432 (1984) (increasing
frequency of dismissal of investor claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)).
M' See generally Respondent's Brief at 18-21, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989) (No. 88-385) (arbitration proceedings
described and compared to trial).
,,9 See generally Katsoris, supra note 34, at 283-84 (discussing history of Uniform
Code of Arbitration in 1976).
40 Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][g], 8-154.18.
"' SEC Staff to Urge, supra note 134.
542 See generally Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][g], 8-154.18 (provisions and
features of NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure discussed).
"' Lipton, supra note 2, at § 4.02[4][a], 4-16.
I" Id.
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industry than arbitration carried out by the securities ex-
changes." 145
Federal securities laws undoubtedly apply in arbitration. Fur-
thermore, the AAA contends that in the years since Wilko, the
courts have developed a body of securities case law to which
arbitrators can, and do, refer.1 46 However, the law may not play
the primary role in arbitration that it does in the judicial process. 47
One commentator even suggests that arbitrators might base their
decisions on grounds other than legal rules.' 48 Although the rela-
tionship between the law and arbitration is beyond the scope of
this Comment, one need not conclude that decisions based on an
arbitrator's ideas of commercial fairness would be prejudicial per
se to customers.
Attempted revisions of the arbitration system must balance the
speed and economics of current practices against the possibility of
efficiency lost by improvements.149 Limited discovery is one of
arbitration's most attractive features due to potential cost savings.
Even though discovery is less thorough in arbitration than in court
proceedings, 150 arbitration discovery can include the use of sub-
poenas of persons and documents as state law permits,'5 ' orders
of appearance, and production of documents held by SRO mem-
bers and their employees.5 2 Additionally, the rules of the NYSE
now provide sanctions for failure to produce documents within
ten days of the request. The failing party is not allowed the use
of documents not delivered to the requesting party.
15 3
141 AAA Releases New Arbitration Rules for Customer-Brokerage Firm Disputes, 19
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1392 (Sep. 18, 1987) [hereinafter AAA Releases New Rules].
146 AAA Brief to McMahon, supra note 130, at 14.
141 See Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute Resolution: Reflections on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 397, 421 n.145 (1988).
For further discussion of the relationship between arbitration and the law, see generally
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846 (1961); Stipanowich,
Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425 (1988).
141 Mentschikoff, The Significance of Arbitration-A Preliminary Inquiry, 17 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 698, 699-703 (1952).
"I Lipton, supra note 2, at § 4 app. 4.01, 4-27.
11o See Katsoris, supra note 34, at 287 n.52.
M National Association of Securities Dealers Code of Arbitration Procedure [here-
inafter NASD CAP] § 32(a), NASD Manual (CCH) 3732, at 3719 (April, 1988); New
York Stock Exchange Rules [hereinafter NYSE Rules] § 619(a), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2619, at 4318 (Feb. 1989).
"I NYSE Rules § 638, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2628, at 4321 (March, 1989).
153 NASD CAP § 33, NASD Manual (CCH) 3733, at 3720 (April, 1988); NYSE
Rules § 620, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 2620, at 4320 (Feb., 1989).
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A 1987 study funded by the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution 154 found that the most common criticism of the arbi-
tration discovery process concerns delay in production or nonre-
ceipt of documents. The study concluded that SRO staff attorneys
need to enforce discovery timetables and encourage cooperative
agreements among the parties. 155 If noncompliance with existing
procedures is the major problem facing the discovery process, then
sanctions such as those imposed by the NYSE are necessary im-
provements.
Some suggest that codifying existing informal SRO practices,
such as allowing involvement of arbitrators in discovery disputes
before the first hearing, would improve arbitration and outweigh
the additional costs and time involved.1 56 The SICA proposed
similar rules well before the McMahon decision.157 Movement to-
ward codification demonstrates industry recognition of needed
reforms.
Under the traditional system, judicial review of an arbitrator's
decision is impaired because of the absence of concrete hearing
records. 58 The lack of transcripts 59 may prevent accurate judicial
assessment of factual errors, or detection of unfairness in the
proceeding.160 Arbitrators already have taken the first steps toward
rectifying this problem. Some SRO arbitration procedures now
require that stenographic or taped records be kept of all hear-
ings. 1
6'
Another serious criticism is that courts and investors cannot
review the reasoning behind an arbitral decision because there are
no written opinions. This will change, however, with new SRO
rules approved in May, 1989 by the SEC. Pursuant to the changes,
summarized one-page award statements of arbitrations will be
'-4 Lipton, supra note 2, at § 4.03[1][2], 4-23-25.
' Id.
156 Katsoris, supra note 82, at 372.
l57 Id. at 372 n.75.
ISS See Comment, supra note 32, at 571-72.
259 The Federal Arbitration Act does not require written records of arbitration pro-
ceedings to be kept. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
11 See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated,
482 U.S. 922 (1987); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 910 (1977); Greater Continental Corp. v. Schechter, 422 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1970);
Comment, supra note 32, at 571-72, 572 n.248.
216 Proposed NYSE Arbitration Summaries Will Not Help Public, SIA Tells SEC, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 339 (March 3, 1989) [hereinafter Proposed NYSE Arbitration].
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available to the public for the first time.' 62 The utility of these
statements is unknown, however, since they will be unpublished
but available to the public at each individual SRO's Public Ref-
erence Room. 163
The statements will conform to a model promulgated by the
SEC, and will include the following elements:
the name of the arbitration case; [a] one-paragraph summary of
the dispute; damages or other relief requested; damages or other
relief awarded; a one-paragraph summary of other issues re-
solved (for example, the arbitrators might rule that they do not
have jurisdiction over a respondent and state that they will not
consider the allegations against the respondent); and names of
the arbitrators.6
Statements issued by the NASD will not include arbitrator names,
but customers facing pending arbitration will be able to obtain
past decisions of the arbitrators involved in their dispute. 165
These changes faced some opposition within the industry. The
Securities Industry Association (SIA) contends that these summa-
ries "will in no way help investors.' 1 66 The SIA argues that the
lack of uniformity in the summaries, diversity in the types of
claims reported, and the unique nature of each case, as well as
the "bargaining process" arbitrators sometimes engage in to reach
their consensus decisions, may hinder the investing public's ability
to evaluate arbitration in general and specific arbitrators in par-
ticular. Ultimately, only time and additional disputes will tell if
these changes will provide customers with anything other than
psychological comfort.
162 SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, Other Revisions to Industry Programs, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 683 (May 12, 1989) [hereinafter SEC Approves Arbitration
Summaries].
163 Id.
164 SEC Staff Suggests Arbitration Group Adopt Use of One-Page Award Statement,
20 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 559 (April 15, 1988) [hereinafter SEC Staff Suggests
Arbitration].
165 SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 162.
I" Proposed NYSE Arbitration, supra note 161; see also Katsoris, supra note 82, at
382-83 (benefits of written opinions outweighed by drawbacks). But see Case Note, Who's
Protecting the Investors? Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987),
Compels Private Claims Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act Into Arbitra-
tion, 19 Agiz. ST. L.J. 793, 816-17 (1987) (therapeutic value of disclosure for public
confidence in market).
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2. Self-Regulatory Nature
The SEC 67 and the Supreme Court 68 have used the expanded
enforcement powers granted to the SEC by 1975 amendments to
the Exchange Act 69 to justify the increased acceptance of securities
dispute arbitration. These amendments gave the Commission sub-
stantially expanded authority to oversee the rules of the SROs as
well as the national exchanges. 70 But reliance on the SEC's ability
to protect investors is not universally accepted. Time delays in-
herent in the Commission's procedures, 7' staff shortages, and an
excessive caseload 72 raise doubts about the quality of supervision.
In addition, the case-by-case scrutiny this oversight requires may
exceed the scope of the Commission's powers. 1
3
The arbitrator's ability to comprehend complex securities issues
and to reach fair settlements is also questioned174 because he or
she must understand both the law and the securities market. This
concern is perhaps overstated when examined in light of AAA
statistics. 175 Eighty percent of AAA arbitrators came from the
legal field, including a significant number of securities practition-
ers and judges, while another eighteen percent had backgrounds
as business, financial, or accounting executives. SRO arbitration
programs show a similar preference for attorneys as public and
industry arbitrators. 76 The predominance of attorneys in arbitra-
tion panels suggests that securities regulation law is correctly un-
derstood and applied by arbitrators. Based on their legal knowledge
and business expertise, one may reason that arbitration panels
possess the requisite abilities to reach proper decisions.
167 SEC Brief to McMahon, supra note 38.
Rodriguez de QuUas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
S69 . 249, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
11 See generally N. Wos.PsoN, R. PmLis & T. Russo, supra note 75, at ch. 12 (self-
regulation examined); Katsoris, supra note 34, at 283-84 (relationship between SEC and
SRO arbitration programs described).
, See Proposed NYSE Arbitration, supra note 161.
,72 See Brief for the Respondent at 30-34, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (86-44); Ingersoll, supra note 6.
" See Case Note, supra note 166, at 816-17.
4 See Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974); Power Replacements, Inc. v.
Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1970); American Safety Equip. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968).
I's AAA Brief to McMahon, supra note 130, at 14 (statistics based on forty AAA
arbitrations preceding McMahon).
176 For statistics on arbitrator pool composition for NYSE and NASD arbitration
programs, see Lipton, supra note 2, at § 4 app. 4.01, 4-41.
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Aside from individual arbitrator competence, the composition
of arbitration panels bears on the fairness of the proceedings. In
NASD arbitrations, the panel is appointed by the NASD Director
of Arbitration, who appoints either three or five arbitrators if the
amount in controversy is less than thirty thousand dollars. Five
arbitrators are appointed if the amount exceeds that figure. 177 In
either case, unless the customer requests otherwise, the majority
of panelists cannot be from the securities industry.
1 78
Recent changes to SRO programs expand the definition of
"industry" arbitrators to include any person associated with an
SRO member or other securities-related entity for three years,
anyone retired from a member organization or similar business,
or any lawyer, accountant, or other professional who has devoted
twenty percent or more of his or her work effort to industry
clients in the last two years, as well as the household members of
an associated person. 79 To further guarantee fairness, each party
has one peremptory challenge, and others may be awarded for
cause by the Director of Arbitration.8 0 Given the apparent quali-
fications of arbitrators and the restrictions placed on their secu-
rities industry ties, one may reasonably conclude that arbitrators
are unbiased and competent to handle disputes.
C. Arbitration and the Future
Legal scholars level meaningful criticisms at the securities ar-
bitration process.1 81 Some argue that securities case law may stag-
nate as more disputes are settled through arbitration, 82 and that
litigation deters broker wrongdoing.'83 Other criticisms include
-- NASD CAP § 19, NASD Manual (CCH) 3719, at 3716 (Jan., 1989); NASD
Proposed Public A wards Disclosure as Part of Arbitration Program Revision, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 1847 (Dec. 9, 1988). See generally Lipton, supra note 2, at § 4 app.
4.01, 4-34 - 4-51 (selection and classification of arbitrators); Katsoris, supra note 82, at
376-80 (training, classification, and selection of arbitrators).
178 NASD CAP § 19, NASD Manual (CCH) 3719, at 3716 (Jan., 1989).
"I SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 162; see also NASD Proposes
Public Awards Disclosure as Part of Arbitration Program Revision, 20 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1847 (Dec. 9, 1988) [hereinafter NASD Proposes] (NYSE proposed definition
of industry arbitrator); cf. Proposed NYSE Arbitration, supra note 161 (SIA proposal for
less strict definition of public arbitrator).
NASD CAP § 22, NASD Manual (CCH) 3722, at 3717 (Jan., 1989).
,' See supra notes 134-80 and accompanying text.
1 See Case Note, supra note 166, at 816-17; Note, supra note 23, at 574.
383 See Malcom & Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L. REv. 725, 755-59
(1986); Note, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 1986 DuK L.J. 548 (1986).
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concerns over arbitrator conflicts of interest, 8 4 biased composition
of arbitration panels,'"" limited review of decisions, 86 limited dis-
covery, 87 and a sense of inherent unfairness in the proceedings.'88
There are reasons to believe that public concerns are being ad-
dressed.
Recent "potentially far-reaching changes to industry arbitra-
tion programs"18 9 have been instituted. As a result of extended
discussion by the members of SICA,' 90 one change "require[s] that
broker-dealers highlight and explain customers' fights" under
mandatory arbitration agreements.' 9' In addition, improved dis-
covery procedures,1 92 and redefinition of "industry" member
arbitrators 93 give the securities arbitration process a more open
image, and therefore inspire public confidence in the market.
Similar improvements in arbitration procedures are taking place
in other areas of the investment industry. 94 Even though the
success of these improvements is not guaranteed, they can help
change negative public attitudes toward arbitration, and make it
an effective means of dispute resolution and investor protection.
The tremendous growth in securities arbitration over the last
decade' 95 also has prompted a concern that practice in unfamiliar
arbitral forums by litigation-oriented attorneys reduces the quality
of client representation. At least one scholar suggests that this is
not problematic because securities practitioners emphasize sub-
stantive law in arbitration proceedings. 96 Others argue that, due
I" See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
,' See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
"8 See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 162; see also NASD Proposes,
supra note 179 (proposals to improve and streamline arbitration process); NYSE Proposes
Highlighting, supra note 129 (proposed changes to arbitration process to meet criticisms
that mandatory arbitration agreements are unfair to customers).
,"I SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 162.
'90 The SICA consists of representatives from the NASD, the national exchanges, and
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, along with four public representatives. See
Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][k], 8-154.34.
,9, SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 162.
192 See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
M' See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
194 See CFTC Staff to Recommend CFTC Limit Role of Sanctioned Exchange Mem-
bers, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 859 (June 9, 1989) [hereinafter CFTC Staff to
Recommend] (Commodities Futures Trading Commission staff considering changes in
futures arbitration similar to those approved by the SEC).
"' See supra note 5.
"' Bloomenthal, supra note 3, at § 8.30[2][f], 8-154.14.
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to experience in presenting cases to an uninformed jury, even
seasoned litigators may be at a disadvantage when dealing with
sophisticated arbitrators. 97 In either case, law schools must begin
to prepare their graduates for arbitration practice. 98
The enforceability of arbitration agreements depends on vol-
untary assent by the parties.' 99 The type of customer account
involved has a significant bearing on whether an arbitration agree-
ment is required in a brokerage contract. According to one SEC
official, only thirty-nine percent of cash accounts involve man-
datory predispute arbitration clauses, and five of the largest bro-
kerage firms do not require arbitration agreements from their cash
account customers. 200 In contrast are earlier SEC comments con-
cerning customer ability to enter the market without an arbitration
agreement. In 1988, an SEC Division of Market Regulation staff
survey indicated a "growing broad-based trend towards requiring
predispute arbitration agreements for cash accounts," 201 and the
refusal of brokerage houses to waive such agreements for "normal
retail customers.' '202
Mandatory arbitration agreements cause concern about the
fairness of the system to the average customer. The willingness of
brokerage houses to waive the same requirements for institutional
investors is described as "unfair to small investors." 203 Indeed,
concern over mandatory arbitration agreements has resulted in
legislative action on the state level. 204 In contrast, one industry
executive argues that mandatory predispute arbitration agreements
do not deny margin access to those unwilling to arbitrate, as his
firm requires only margin and option account customers to sign
such agreements. The seventy-eight percent of customers who
,97 See Comment, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon: The Expanding Scope
of Securities Arbitration, 12 NOVA L.J. 1375, 1404 (1988).
"I Id. at 1405.
'1' See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 127, at 445-48.
2 SEC Approves Arbitration Summaries, supra note 162 (quoting SEC Commissioner
Joseph Grundfest). The five firms are Merrill Lynch & Co., Paine Webber Group Inc.,
A.G. Edwards & Sons Inc., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., and Kidder, Peabody & Co. Inc.
10, SEC Tables Proposal, supra note 136 (quoting SEC Division of Market Regulation
Director Richard Ketchum).
= Id.
20 Id. (quoting SEC Chairman David Ruder); see also CFTC Staff to Recommend,
supra note 194, at 859 (Non-mandatory arbitration agreements in commodities trading
means "arbitration in the futures industry has great advantages over securities arbitration,"
according to CFTC member.).
20 See Legislative Briefs: Maryland, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 81 (Jan. 13,
1989); Massachusetts Proposal, supra note 4.
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maintain case accounts are not required to sign agreements, and
margin account customers may avoid agreements by borrowing
from banks rather than the brokerage houses.205 Furthermore, one
commentator questions whether brokerage houses as profit-ori-
ented businesses would turn away customers unwilling to sign
agreements .206
A possible alternative approach is a two-tiered commission
structure allowing customers access to even margin and option
accounts without arbitration agreements. 207 This differential in
price for services would reflect the additional cost associated with
litigation as a dispute resolution method. However, questions re-
garding limits on non-agreement surcharges, and the viability of
such a two-tiered structure in a highly competitive market, remain
unanswered.2 8
Further improvements to arbitration procedures are needed.
But the danger exists that the present advantages of arbitral fo-
rums might be lost in alterations that imitate litigation.2 9 A merger
of arbitration and litigation, much like that of law and equity,
has also been predicted as a result of changes to protect inves-
tors. 210
Changes in arbitration procedures and the selection of arbitra-
tors may not be sufficient to eliminate the perception of unfair-
ness. 21 On the other hand, arbitration procedures conducted by
an independent agency, unaffiliated with any SRO or the securities
industry, but remaining under the oversight authority of the SEC,
are likely to insure investor confidence in unbiased arbitration.
Dispute resolution must be fair and unbiased, in appearance
and in practice. Perhaps only the passage of time and increasing
numbers of apparently fair and satisfactory customer recoveries
will legitimize securities arbitration in the public eye. If linked
with progressive reforms to arbitration and forums independent
of the securities industry, customer recoveries should result in
strong investor confidence. With public faith in arbitral proceed-
ings, the primary function of broker-customer arbitration can be
2 Massachusetts Proposal, supra note 4, at 1219 (citing Paul DuBow, Senior vice
president and deputy general counsel for Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.).
See Hood, supra note 137, at 578.
Katsoris, supra note 82, at 375.
SId.
2 Fletcher, supra note 127, at 463-67.
210 Id.
2 Katsoris, supra note 82, at 383-86.
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accomplished-the protection of investors through fair and expe-
dient dispute resolution.
CONCLUSION
In the Rodriguez de Quijas decision, the Court took a major
step in promoting arbitration as a system of dispute resolution
beneficial to all parties involved. It determined that improvements
to arbitration indicate that disputes under either the Securities Act
or the Exchange Act may be resolved through arbitration without
infringement of investor rights. The Court endorsed the SEC
interpretation that past controversies regarding the purposes of
the Securites Act and the Exchange Act are well resolved by a
focus not on the rights granted by the acts themselves, but on the
contractual nature of predispute arbitration agreements. The need
for harmonious interpretation of the two acts is consistant with
current Supreme Court thought regarding the requirements for
overruling its own precedent. Moreover, this reluctance to reverse
earlier Court pronouncements indicates that the Rodriguez de
Quijas decision will have lasting impact.
This Comment demonstrates that arbitration of securities dis-
putes is fair and non-discriminatory. 212 The public image of bias
is probably the most serious problem in securities arbitration to-
day. 213 This perception can be corrected by reforms such as in-
creased discovery,214 redefinition of "industry" arbitrators, 2 5 and
award summaries. 216 The permanent solution, however, apparently
lies not in changes to resemble litigation, but in the establishment
of arbitration proceedings independent of the SROs and the se-
curities industry.217 Dispute resolution untainted by suspicion can
preserve securities arbitration as it should be, a swift and econom-
ical tool to settle broker-client controversies.
Leslie William Moore
212 See supra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 182-211 and accompanying text.
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